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Abstract 
This paper describes the socio-economic adjustment effects exerted by globalization (taking 
as starting points competitive pressure, sectoral shifts, and financial market contagion) and 
discusses their relevance for domestic policy-making. I argue that these economic pressures 
and the resulting transformations in the domestic economy constrain government’s policy 
choice set to an extent that actual policies are quite freed from any political ideological 
context. However, important government tasks in a globalized economy remain: remedying 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, regulating markets to combat 
externalities, as well as providing essential goods. 
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1. Introduction
1
 
 
A new phenomenon is increasingly getting into the focus of socio-economic research: 
(economic) globalization and how it impacts people’s socio-economic wellbeing. As such, 
international trade is not new to mankind – as its history, spanning from the Roman Empire, 
the middle-aged Hansa trade organization, to the trans-Alpine and the Sino-European silk 
trade routes, suggests. However, prior to the 19
th
 century, cross-national and cross-regional 
exchange had its physical limits and was often restricted to highly profitable luxury goods: 
For example, trade of firm shares through financial markets was limited to the firms in the 
region close-by, with the financial market’s reach determined by the horse speed of 
messengers traveling on streets that turned into mud in autumn. Also, most goods traded were 
profitable luxury goods consumed by the richer middle and upper classes, e.g. gold, wine, 
silk, salt, spices (one may recall the wine-cloth example in the Ricardo model, where British 
cloth at that time was of the highest quality). However, this picture of rather marginal 
economic international connectedness changed with the dawn of industrialization, as 
technologies for cheap mass production and new transport technologies became available, but 
also through its improvements in contract enforceability and abolishment of bridge tolls, 
import and export taxes. 
 
With the dawn of industrialization rather small-scale international trade ‘turned’ into what we 
may call nowadays ‘(economic) globalization’, or the ‘globalized economy’. The new quality 
of this phenomenon is that it affects now not only an aristocratic or wealthy elite but the 
common man, in various dimensions: first, goods traded include now mostly normal goods 
(and its components) that are consumed on a daily basis, ranging from toilet paper to yoghurt, 
aiming at meeting a common man’s wants; second, capital flows now freely across countries, 
seeking the most attractive investment opportunities, open to be taken up by the common man 
(and their portfolio managers). Globalization also affects the common man not only in his/her 
role as consumer and investor, but also as worker, as the opening-up of the domestic market 
to foreign imports pressures his/her employer to stay competitive – and this not only in a 
specific, small export sector, but in all economic sectors that are directly or indirectly exposed 
to foreign supply and demand. Finally, the common man in his/her role as laborer may decide 
herself to migrate to the best-paid job, transgressing borders between states. Economic 
globalization as such is a dynamic process that transforms the structure of the domestic 
economy, and once it has gained a certain momentum, it continuously accelerates and 
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becomes unstoppable. In such globalized world, development prospect of the domestic 
economy increasingly depends on international trade and capital markets, and, thus, at large, 
so does also the wellbeing of the common man.   
 
This paper discusses whether the turning of the national economy into a globalized economy 
has an effect on governments’ choice set of feasible policies. The underlying idea is that as a 
country globalizes, its economic development becomes more and more determined by 
external economic drivers, and lesser and lesser by internal processes; globalization forces the 
domestic economy to stay competitive, to deregulate markets, to lower government spending 
and tax levels, triggering brutal and unavoidable structural changes, causing much collateral 
social ‘damage’ such as growing sectoral unemployment and increasing income inequality. In 
addition, stronger financial linkages across countries make the single country more vulnerable 
to developments in their trading partners’ economies. In consequence, national governments 
loose their discretionary decision-making power and influence over many areas of their 
domestic economies. This paper draws this conclusion by presenting classical and modern 
models of trade and providing illustrative examples of sectoral structural changes; the 
innovative contribution lies in discussing these otherwise quite known predictions and 
developments from a new angle - that is from the viewpoint of domestic governments’ policy 
choices. It concludes with a discussion of which tasks remain for the domestic government in 
a globalized economy: namely combating the negative effects of globalization through 
smoothing socio-economic transformation processes, stabilizing the economy as protection 
against cross-country contagion effects, remedying information asymmetries in markets, 
imposing Pigovian taxes on imported goods produced abroad under violation of workers’ or 
human rights, and, finally, publicly providing, or controlling the supply of, essential goods 
such as water, electricity, infrastructure, and food.  
 
 
 
2. The impact of globalization on the domestic economy 
 
Economic globalization, as described in the introduction, is the increasing integration of a 
country into the world markets for goods, capital, and labor. Domestically, such increasing 
exposure to international markets manifests in rising volumes of exported and imported goods 
and services, as well as in growing outflows of domestic savings into foreign investment 
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projects, and increasing inflows of foreign capital into domestic companies. With today’s 
modern means of transportation and English as established ‘lingua franca’, economic 
globalization is also reflected in an increasing mobility of labor across countries, skilled and 
unskilled likewise.
2
 Economic globalization also manifests in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(such as in the re-location of entire production facilities into foreign countries), in joint 
ventures between domestic and foreign companies (inducing knowledge transfer across 
countries), and in services provided from ‘abroad’ for domestic companies and vice versa. 
Overall, economic globalization is a multidimensional dynamic process of integrating one 
country into the world economy that, once it has gained a certain momentum, continuously 
accelerates and becomes unstoppable (see, e.g., Proudman and Redding, 2000, for a dynamic 
model). The following sections discuss the socio-economic effects of globalization with a 
special focus on competitive pressure, on sectoral-structural changes, on financial 
international interdependencies, and how these processes generate strictly binding constraints 
for domestic policy choices.  
 
 
2.1. Globalization pressures domestic economy to be efficient 
The process of globalization forces the domestic economy to stay competitive; this has, from 
government’s point of view, the disadvantage of restraining her policy choice set and, thus, 
limiting her discretionary power over the country. For example, integration of the domestic 
economy into goods and capital world markets forces local producers to increase their 
efficiency in production and to produce at competitive costs, in order to remain attractive for 
(foreign) investors and (foreign) consumers (similarly, Garett 1995); consequently, as 
economic globalization increases, domestic firms may lobby for a deregulation of national 
labor markets. Domestic firms under pressure may also demand lower taxes and social 
security contributions, which both make the production factor ‘labor’ more costly, thus 
lowering their international competitiveness (see similarly, Blank and Freeman, 1994). 
Indeed, the model by Cai and Treisman, (2005) predicts that, under capital mobility, countries 
with an initially rich endowment in one production factor will have, in equilibrium, generated 
an attractive business environment with low tax levels and less government spending. A 
shrinking tax base, however, exerts pressure on governments to reduce their absolute and 
relative spending levels (Garett and Mitchell, 2001; Hines and Summers, 2009). This welfare 
spending restraining effect is often referred to as the ‘disciplining effect’ of economic 
globalization (e.g., Garett, 1995). On the empirical side, Garett and Mitchell (2001) report a 
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restraining impact of trade openness on government spending, while Plümper et al. (2005) 
show analogous effects exerted by the amount of low-wage imports (for budget compositional 
effects, see, e.g., Garrett, 1995).
3
 In support of the labor-market related predictions, the 
accounts in Lindert and Williamson (2001) suggest that increasing trade openness is often 
accompanied by domestic market liberalization and a decreasing generosity of the welfare 
state. Similarly, Fischer and Somogyi (2012) and Dreher and Gaston (2007) have shown that 
over the last 20 years economic globalization in OECD countries has led to a decrease in 
worker’s employment protection and union density.4 Taken altogether, in order to stay 
competitive in a globalized world, governments are under pressure to deregulate labor 
markets, to liberalize capital markets and, ultimately, to lower taxes and government 
spending. Most importantly for my argumentation, such economic pressures persist 
irrespective of the political ideology of the national party that is currently in power (e.g., 
Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Qian and Roland, 1998).    
 
 
2.2. Globalization induces structural changes across economic sectors 
Another example for how the domestic government looses discretionary power over the 
domestic economy are the unavoidable long-run effects of economic globalization on the 
relative size of the sectors in an economy, the employment prospects of low-skilled and high-
skilled workers, and the consequences for income distribution. According to the standard 
model of trade (e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld, 2012), integration into the world economy 
causes a country to specialize in the economic sector the country has a comparative advantage 
relative to the world market (e.g., because of a relative or absolute abundance of a certain 
production factor). In OECD countries, such specialization will be rather in the industrial than 
in the agricultural sector, rather in high-skilled than in low-skilled labor production, and rather 
in capital-intensive than in labor-intensive industries. Classical trade models which assume 
full employment predict then overall income inequality to increase as the immobile, sector-
specific factor in the exporting sector gains from trade, while its sector-specific counterpart in 
the other sector loses (Ricardo-Viner model); applied to OECD countries, high-skilled labor 
would experience wage increases, while wage of low-skilled workers would fall. This 
development is acerbated by productivity growth through learning-by-doing effects in the 
exporting sector (Proudman and Redding, 2000).
5
 In consequence, at the sectoral level, forces 
of globalization will attract production factors into those sectors and industries the domestic 
economy specializes in, while, on the other hand, setting free production factors in the 
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economic sectors that are destined to contract. This structural change is aggravated through 
international capital flows and FDI, transferring more efficient technologies from abroad into 
exporting local firms (Bernstein, 2000; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Mohnen, 2001; van 
Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg, 2001), forcing inefficient competitors out of the domestic 
market (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). Also the classical Rybczynski–theorem predicts capital 
inflows to acerbate this development: under fixed goods prices a rise in factor endowment 
should increase the output overproportionally of that economic sector that uses this factor 
intensively – leading to (further) (relative) specialization in that sector and shrinkage of the 
other. Thus, for OECD countries one may expect an inflow of capital that increases the 
production of capital-intensive goods, ultimately contributing to further contraction of the 
labor-intensive production.  
 
With labor market rigidities, dislocations caused by such structural changes may include 
increased job turnover and short-run structural or frictional unemployment (for a model, see, 
e.g., Bernard et al., 2007). Assuming a two-factor two-good Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
capital and labor but allowing for unemployment, Davidson et al. (1999) predict 
unemployment to rise in the sector that uses labor intensively but does not export – caused by 
the endogenous sector-specifity of labor resulting from matching and searching costs. 
Supporting empirical evidence for the unemployment-increasing effect of trade liberalization 
can be found in, e.g., Trefler (2004) for the case of the NAFTA.
6
 In developed countries, 
specialization in the high-technology industry with high-skilled labor may then lead to mass 
dismissals of unskilled workers in the low-technology industry, exerting pressure on their 
wages. Krugman (1995) has shown that in the US with flexible labor markets wages for low-
skilled workers (possibly employed in the contracting economic sector) have declined, while 
in Europe instead, with more rigid labor markets, unemployment of low-skilled workers has 
risen.  
 
That globalization increases income disparities between workers and capital owners is 
concluded by, e.g., ten Raa and Mohnen (2008) who suggest that international competition in 
goods markets drives down rents on labor, while (positive) rent levels on capital persist for 
future R&D investments. Already the classical Rybczynski–theorem predicts that in 
developed countries international trade leads to higher rents for capital and high-skilled labor 
than for other production factors.
7
 Applying tax competition models to an international 
context, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) conclude that under strong economic globalization, in 
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developed countries with their larger capital endowments tax levels are lowered, implying less 
means for redistribution and a more skewed income distribution, when compared to 
developing countries that are abundant in labor. In general, economists hypothesize that 
globalization most possibly forces governments to tax bases that are least responsive to the 
forces of worldwide competition – implying that those production factors are taxed higher that 
are relatively less mobile than the other ones, such as immobile labor in classical trade models 
(Garett, 1995; see Bretschger and Hettich, 2002, for empirical evidence). Indeed, taxation of 
labor (wages) is rather observed in populous countries, while in small countries with higher 
international labor mobility rather goods, services, and imports are taxed (Hines and 
Summers, 2009) - reducing overall fiscal progressivity. Many other modern trade theories 
equally predict a more skewed income distribution, e.g., Egger and Kreickmeier (2009), 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997), and Gaston and Nelson (2002). That economic globalization 
causes particularly wage disparities in OECD countries to grow has been empirically shown 
by Wood (1994), Burtless (1995), Dollar (2002), Dreher and Gaston (2008), while the 
confirmatory study by Smeeding (2002) uses a micro-level approach.
8
  
 
Empirical evidence on sectoral shifts 
While there is ample empirical research on the linkages between international trade and 
income inequality and unemployment (see above), the evidence on the impact of globalization 
on sectoral shifts in the economy merits a separate in-depth investigation. That the forces of 
economic globalization cause structural changes in the involved economies can be concluded 
from country-sector-specific developments of sectoral (relative) export shares, sectoral 
employment, and sectoral contribution to GDP.
9
 Proudman and Redding (2000) show such 
industrial development patterns for the G-5 economies between 1970 and 1993: For example, 
a loss in comparative advantage is observed in the motor vehicle industries in France and the 
USA, the computer sector in Germany, the metal production in Great Britain, and the textile 
industry in Japan. In contrast, specialization occurred in the communication industry in the 
U.K., in the paper and printing industry in the U.S., in the aerospace industry in France, and in 
the motor vehicle industry in Japan. In general, since the 50ies Middle and Southern Europe 
experienced the closing down of footwear and cloth manufactures. Since the nineties the same 
occurred in post-communist Eastern Europe (see ILO, 1996); for example, in Latvia the shoe 
pair production shrank between 1990 and 2008 from some 20 million pairs to some mere 
156’000 pairs (1996: 2,2 millions).10 In the same geographic region, this development was 
paralleled by the shrinking of the agricultural sector, resulting in a growing dependence on 
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agricultural imports from mainly developing countries.
11
 In consequence, employment in 
these shrinking sectors decreased. For example, between 1980 and 1993 employment in the 
textile, clothing, and footwear industries declined by 40% in Germany, by 35% in Spain, by 
51% in Poland, and by 30% in the USA (see ILO, 1996).
12
 Prominent present-time examples 
of sectoral changes in Western Europe include the phasing out of subsidizing the coal and 
mining sectors as well as parts of the automotive sector, where the pressure to do so increased 
substantially because of the fall of the iron curtain and the emergence of the automobile sector 
in the South-East Asian countries. From 1985 to 2007, employment in British mines fell from 
220’000 workers to 7’000 workers (Germany: 607’000 workers in 1957, then 166’000 in 
1985, and 35’000 in 2007); main coal producer is now China.13 Between 1997 and 2005 the 
contribution of the automotive industry to GDP has substantially fallen in France, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Spain (with the exception of Germany which specialized in high-end 
products), while at the same time the car production has tripled in India and quadrupled in 
China (see Holweg et al., 2009).  
 
Since the driving factors of these sectoral shifts are structural ones, namely the loss in 
comparative advantage in specific industries, subsidizing the production in such ‘endangered’ 
industries may only reduce the speed of these adjustment processes and appease the workers 
in the shrinking sectors. In the long-run, however, as globalization increases, subsidies will 
cause greater economic inefficiencies and welfare losses, ultimately becoming so large that 
budgetary and efficiency concerns will force governments to put this policy to an end. 
Notably, in Germany the decision in 2007 to cease subsidizing coal mining was made by a 
left-right pro-worker coalition government – being an illustrative example that globalization 
leads to economic necessities that supersede political ideology.
14
  
 
Taken altogether, despite its positive impact on economic growth through innovation and 
efficiency gains, globalization exerts pressures on economic sectors with a comparative 
disadvantage, making them contract and letting entire industries disappear; the resulting 
sectoral unemployment and increase in overall income inequality will occur despite national 
government’s efforts to gain control and possibly counteract this process, and irrespective of 
the couleur of the political parties in power.  
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2.3. Globalization leads to dependence on international financial markets 
Finally, economic globalization also manifests in the increasing linkages between foreign and 
domestic financial markets (through economic interdependencies, but also through herding 
contagion via the behavior of internationally acting investors, see Calvo und Reinhart, 1996; 
Dornbusch et al., 2000; Khan and Park, 2009). Thus, globalization is predicted to aggravate 
the impact of a recession or a financial market crash abroad on the domestic economy. The 
higher the degree of a country’s economic integration is, the larger the effect of the world 
economy on the local economy will be; the strongerly interlinked national economies all over 
the world are, the more likely economic ‘domino effects’ are to occur (similarly, Hertz 
1999).
15
 Due to the speed of the cross-national transactions in milliseconds (‘high frequency 
trading’) and the information transparency in financial and capital markets, as compared to 
goods markets, cross-country domino effects are more likely to be transmitted first through 
the financial channels before they start, with some time lag, working through the traditional 
international trade-in-goods-relations (Hernández and Valdés, 2001; Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder, 2001; Forbes, 2004).
16
  
 
Illustrative examples for domino effects are various past- and present-time financial market 
crises, among others, the US stock market crash of October 1987, the Mexican crisis of 1994, 
the Asian crash of 1997, US-driven crisis of 2008-09, the new economy bubble-burst of 
1999/2000, and the Eurozone crisis of 2011 (e.g., Kleimeier et al., 2008; Khan and Park, 
2009; Markwat et al., 2009):
17
 the 1997 Asian crisis, for instance, started first with a currency 
crisis in Thailand, then spilled over to financial markets in Asian countries of the same region 
– one argues through herding contagion of Western investors, others argue owed to inefficient 
financial intermediation of moral-hazard-infected ‘finance companies’ and market prices of 
capital and land –; finally, the Thailand crisis spilled-over also to developed countries such as 
the U.S.A. and Western Europe (Ito, 2007; Krugman, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). In 
2008/09, it was the break-down of the US American market for houses (after a deregulation of 
the domestic banking sector), followed by that for mortgages loans, then that for mortgage-
backed securities, which then triggered first a local US-wide, and then finally a world-wide 
financial market crisis: the sudden collapse in mutual trust between then undercapitalized 
private and public financial intermediaries led to a liquidity crisis worldwide (on the role of 
trust, see also Guiso, 2010).
18
 In the case of the 2010-11 crisis, the over-accumulation of debts 
of the Greek government of up to 150% of GDP first affected the market for government 
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bonds of Greece only, where interest rates started to skyrocket,
19
 leading to a loss in 
sovereignty over their national budget to the IMF and the EU (Alessi, 2011). Then, via the 
EURO-currency-link and ‘wake-up-effects’ (Forbes, 2004)20, the entire Euro-currency area 
got into the focus of international investors’ critical assessments, and interest rates for 
national treasure bonds increased, particularly strongly for the PIGS-countries.
21
 With the 
remaining Euro countries partly and temporarily bailing out Greece, Portugal, and Ireland
22
, 
the debt crisis of Greece became a EURO-collective one: first, with shrinking credibility and 
creditworthiness of the Greek government spilling over to other PIGS countries (‘sovereign 
debt contagion’), and, then, to the initially unaffected EURO-non-PIGS-countries, whose 
growing rescue efforts let their own debt-to-GDP ratios rise substantially (see Alessi, 2011, 
for an analysis of the Eurozone crisis).
23
 
 
There is empirical evidence that financial linkages via international capital markets ultimately 
spill over into the real economy. In particular, the financial market crises described above are 
shown to impact the real economy of countries all around the world – through triggering 
lower growth, causing considerable inflation, in addition to higher unemployment and larger 
government debt (Ito, 2007; Mishkin, 1992).
24
 For example, “the October 1987 crash […] 
reduced stock prices by over 20% in most developed markets” (Markwat, 2009, p.1996), 
leading to bankruptcies of banks and firms (Krugman, 1998). In 2008/2009, as a result of the 
US housing market crisis Irish banks collapsed, which lead to a shrinkage of GDP by 10%  
and an increase in unemployment by 9 percentage points (e.g., Alessi, 2011). Similarly, the 
Eurozone crisis forced the Greek government to carry out (exogenously imposed) budget cuts, 
letting Greek unemployment rates skyrocket from about 12% to 18% (September 2011), 
compared to one year ago, and the youth unemployment rate reach 46% (September 2011).
25
 
Similarly for the other PIGS-countries, youth unemployment in Spain rose from 42.8% to 
49.3% (from 10/2010 to 10/2011), and in Portugal from 27% to 31%, but stayed at 30% in 
Italy (November 2011; January 2012: 31%). In other EU countries during the same period, 
youth unemployment was falling, such as in Slovenia and Finland (18% to 12%, and 19% to 
16%, respectively).
26
 Taken altogether, my argument in these examples is not that in PIGS-
countries globalization forces domestic governments to cut debts against their will (which 
would have become economically necessary anyhow); rather, my argument is that 
globalization exogenously imposes a specific timeline on domestic policy-making, in 
particular a certain speed and roughness in making reforms that might not be in congruence 
with local political preferences. Overall, growing global linkages through financial markets let 
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foreign economies and investors gain more and more impact on the domestic economy, taking 
the country out of the control of local policy-making.  
 
 
 
3. Globalization constrains policy choices of domestic governments 
 
The discussion so far has revealed that globalization exerts strong pressures on the domestic 
economy to stay competitive and to reduce government spending, that it triggers fast and 
rough sectoral shifts, and that it creates strong international financial dependencies. As an 
inevitable result, these pressures of globalization constrain domestic government’s choice set 
w.r.t. economic policy-making: Globalization induces structural changes that are, in the long-
run, unavoidable, possibly creating mass unemployment in one economic sector, while 
leading to economic growth and worker shortage in another sector, increasing income 
inequality not only within the group of workers, but also between workers and capital-owners. 
In addition, in order to stay competitive, globalization also exerts pressures to pursue policies 
of labor market deregulation, to shift the tax burden from capital onto less mobile labor and 
consumption, and to cut government and welfare spending. Finally, globalization creates 
vibrant trade and capital linkages across countries leading to strong cross-national economic 
dependencies and domino effects, with the potential to aggravate or even to cause national 
economic crises, exogenously determining the speed of domestic reforms. Obviously, 
globalization makes the domestic economy re-structure - which may be to the benefit of some 
societal groups (production factors), but equally to the disadvantage of others.
27
  
 
The argument here is not about assessing whether these economic adjustment processes are 
overally ‘good’ or ‘bad’; the argument I develop here is about that these changes and most of 
their socio-economic consequences are not under the control of domestic politics. The idea 
here is that governments may be compelled to carry out policies that are entirely ‘dictated’ by 
the forces of economic globalization, that is the needs of investors, producers, and workers (in 
developed countries: high-skilled laborers) in the domestic exporting sectors and the demands 
in the importing markets abroad.  
 
In its final consequence, globalization may free domestic government’s policies from their 
ideological context: Irrespective of the ideology of the ruling party, under the pressures of 
 13 
globalization any government may be forced to deregulate labor markets, to cut taxes and 
welfare spending, and to let domestic capital flow freely into more lucrative investment 
projects abroad. Expressed with the words of Garrett (1995, p.670): “From a neoclassical 
perspective, the ability of the left and organized labor to [pursue leftist policies such as to] 
increase government spending, tax capital heavily, and pursue expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies would decrease with exposure to trade and capital mobility”. Nevertheless, 
I argue that a similar statement equally holds true for certain policies preferred by more 
conservative-minded voters: opening up the economy may force domestic industries, e.g., to 
pay competitive wages, reducing the premium on male labor (‘positive discrimination’), and 
to employ only the most productive workers, causing a higher female labor force participation 
(see Becker, 1957/1971); both changes would then result in the destruction of the traditional 
role model in society. In addition, already the decision to pursue a policy of trade openness 
constrains both left-wing and right-wing governments at home likewise, as such policy 
requires macroeconomic stability, in particular a low level of inflation - with all its labor-
market, debt-related, and distributional consequences (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002). 
 
Taken altogether, economic globalization imposes a strictly binding economic constraint on 
national government’s discretionary power over domestic politics, forcing her to accept 
exogenously imposed economic adjustment processes and to pursue policies that may not be 
consistent with her (less binding) political ideologies. Consequently, globalization lets 
national governments seemingly lose steering power over their domestic economies.  
 
 
 
4. Outlook to the future of domestic policy-making 
 
The previous discussion provides evidence that the transformation of the domestic economy 
induced by (economic) globalization pressures ruling politicians (partly channeled by 
lobbying activities of the affected socio-economic groups) to pursue certain policies; these 
pressures may become so strong that their own ideological constraints become less binding 
for their political decision-making. A prominent real-life example is that of left-wing pro-
worker governments that are forced to deregulate labor markets and to relax workers’ 
employment protection (Dreher and Gaston, 2007; Fischer and Somogyi, 2012; see section 
2.1.). In the short-run, domestic governments may well try to compensate and counteract 
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certain ongoing structural changes in the economy; for example, in Europe and the U.S. the 
shrinking of the mining and agricultural sectors had been combated through government 
subsidies – which had kept costs of production artificially low. We have seen, however, that, 
in the long-run, such counteracting policies generate more inefficiencies than benefits to 
society and are, therefore, economically not sustainable – in the very end, both left-wing and 
right-wing governments likewise will prefer to put paying subsidies for dying industries to an 
end. Particularly in the light of limited government budgets, opportunity costs of such non-
sustainable subsidies are high, as these financial resources could be more wisely invested in 
the prerequisites for economic growth in general, e.g. schooling, infrastructure, and R&D, and 
particularly in those sectors with a (potential) comparative advantage in the world market (see 
also sections 4.3., 4.4.2., 4.4.3.).
28
 
 
What would a sensible government policy in a globalized economy then look like? Where are 
its limits? Where do lie domestic governments’ obligations to intervene? 
 
 
4.1. The role of human nature 
What governments cannot change is human nature as such – that is the striving for 
maximization of benefits from economic activities (be it gainful employment or profit-
generating production), as classical economic theory assumes. Consequently, human beings in 
their role as traders are believed to always seek the most profitable investment opportunity, in 
their role as consumers and producers to choose the cheapest offer (of otherwise homogenous 
consumption goods/production factors), and in their role as employee to take the job that pays 
the highest wage. Owed to such rational human behavior, we all contribute to, and cause, the 
pressures exerted by globalization: choosing the cheapest consumption good induces 
pressures on managers to cut production costs through dismissal of (more costly) older 
workers, and seeking the most profitable investment projects forces firm owners to lobby for 
lower capital tax levels and labor market deregulation, while taking the job with the highest 
net pay pressures local governments to cut down income taxes and welfare state spending, etc. 
Human nature was also a main driving force in the recent financial market crises: young male 
investment bankers’ choice of assets was and still is most possibly driven by their level of 
testosterone – compared to the average population, their higher levels make them less risk-
averse and less patient (Coates and Herbert, 2008; Stanton et al., 2011).
29
 Consequently, these 
also personally competing young men, then turning almost risk-neutral, are most likely to 
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invest in highly volatile assets promising higher returns, and to exploit marginal price 
differences between milliseconds in stock markets (‘high frequency trading’) – with the final 
economic consequences of exaggerated volatility, market destabilization and, possibly, 
financial crises.
30
 Taken altogether, the mechanisms which these socio-economic pressures of 
globalization arise from are in-built in our human nature and cannot be eradicated. 
 
So how much of, and what of, policy-making does remain then for domestic governments? 
We recognize now that certain structural changes triggered by globalization are inescapable 
and unstoppable – they will occur irrespective of domestic governments’ political preferences 
and generate social and financial ‘pain’ for certain socio-economic groups that are now forced 
to undergo a process of adaptation. In the following sections I will discuss the tasks that are 
left to domestic governments in a globalized economy; in particular, I will argue that the 
classical government tasks as described by Musgrave (1959) not only remain but even gain in 
importance - which there are macro-economic stabilization, income redistribution through 
taxes and transfers, and optimization of resource allocation.  
 
 
4.2. Macro-economic stability 
We have already seen that macro-economic stability is a necessary prerequisite for reaping 
economic benefits from opening-up the domestic economy to foreign markets (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 2002); robust economic fundamentals are also ways to protect the economy at 
home against contagious spill-overs from international financial markets (see also sections 3. 
and 2.3.). In particular, a sound macro-economic policy would include the correction of 
domestic market failures preventing healthy economic growth, e.g., through providing  
schooling (e.g., Barro 2001; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001), 
communication and transport infrastructure (e.g., Esfahani and Ramírez, 2003; Munnell, 
1992; Roeller, and Wavermann, 2001; Temple and Johnson, 1998), internal safety and regime 
stability (e.g., Alesina et al., 1996; Barro and Lee, 1994), through subsidizing R&D (e.g., 
Bayoumi et al., 1999; Segerstrom, 2007), but also through improving institutions that govern 
market processes, for example institutions which protect investments and intellectual property 
(e.g., Aidt et al., 2008; Castro et al., 2004, 2009; Gould and Gruben, 1996).
31
 Efficiency 
implications of liberalization and privatization policies for public goods provision are 
discussed in section 4.4.3. Furthermore, the importance of a sound macro-economic policy 
(promising future growth) and its credible communication to the public for re-establishing 
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(foreign) investors’ trust can be shown in the recent example of the Euro crisis, in particular in 
the development of diverging interest rates on state bonds between the two PIGS countries 
Greece and Italy since January 2012.
32
 In sum, globalization is linked to growth-and-stability-
promoting government policies not only as the latter is a prerequisite to the first (see section 
3.), but also through direct and indirect impacts of openness on the domestic economy (e.g., 
Barro, 2001) or through local growth-promoting policy instruments that originate from trade 
policy (e.g., tariffs and quotas).  
 
 
4.3. Redistribution and smoothing of transformation process 
In a globalized economy the government task of income and wealth redistribution not only 
remains, but even grows in importance. Economic theory predicts that the transformation 
processes induced by globalization would not only generate social and financial ‘pain’ for 
certain socio-economic groups, but would also foster overall growth, lower general 
unemployment, and, in the long-run, facilitate the accumulation of national wealth (Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Felbermayer et al., 2011; Frankel and Romer, 
1999; Krueger, 1983); societal groups that benefit from globalization would include producers 
who are now able to seek the cheapest or most productive labor around the world, investors 
who can reap maximum returns form highly profitable investment projects abroad, and, 
finally, laborers at home with the appropriate skills whose earnings increase as their exporting 
sector expands (for literature, see footnote 27). Not unexpectedly has globalization often been 
brought in correlation with an increase in income inequality (see section 2.2.) – with 
potentially growth-lowering effects (e.g. through weakening property rights, Keefer and 
Knack, 2002).
33
 Despite the unavoidability of all these globalization-induced transformation 
processes in the domestic economy, within certain boundaries, governments may be able to 
compensate the ‘losers’ of this transformation, channel these changes, smooth certain 
transition processes, and exert influence on the speed by which the domestic economy is 
adapting. For example, particularly in wealthy countries, national governments may afford 
paying unemployment benefits for dismissed workers in the shrinking sectors and finance 
their acquisition of new, now-wanted skills – Barro (2001) emphasizes the importance of 
technology-compatible education of workers for economic growth. Similarly, governments 
may support the transition to employing state-of-the-art technologies in production – as 
illustrative example Fan et al. (2008) report positive effects of subsidizing technology change 
in Indian agriculture. Furthermore, governments may provide limited support to start-up 
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enterprises and the founding of innovative industries in existing and potential exporting 
sectors (e.g., through temporary tax exemptions for venture capital firms) (Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2003).
34
 While government’s political ideology may possibly have an influence on 
the choice of compensation schemes and policy instruments for smoothing, retarding, or 
facilitating these adjustment processes in the domestic economy, in my view, it would not 
impact the general direction of the economic transformation processes as such.  
 
Despite the distortive impact of government interventions in the market process when markets 
are ‘perfect’ in any aspect otherwise (First Welfare Theorem), the Second Welfare Theorem 
postulates that government’s redistributive activities would achieve a Pareto-efficient 
allocation in equilibrium if they related to individuals’ initial endowments only, equalizing 
agents’ starting conditions (in classical economics, their wealth), prior to their income-
generating economic interacting (‘equal opportunities’, similarly Rawls, 1971). However, 
such view neglects the unpredictable dynamics of transition processes in a globalized 
economy, by assuming a static world in which agents would be able to decide on their utility-
maximizing choices at young age for the rest of their lives.  
 
Overall, we may conclude that the unequal distribution of gains and losses from globalization 
calls for redistributive government activities, in particular in order to facilitate and to smooth 
these socio-economic transformation processes.    
 
 
4.4. Improvements of resource and goods allocations 
Globalization, however, does not exempt domestic governments from their traditional role as 
optimizer of resource and goods allocations when market mechanisms fail to achieve the 
Pareto-efficient allocation by themselves – by providing public goods, levying taxes, and 
setting regulations (Blankart, 2003; Musgrave, 1959).
35
 Thus, letting the forces of 
globalization work does NOT imply admitting Neo-liberalism and Laissez-faire policies in the 
domestic economy as a whole: government interventions in the economy are still needed 
wherever market failures preventing Pareto-efficiency occur. Such classical failures include 
external effects like pollution of the environment (climate change), underprovision of public 
goods by private actors (infrastructure, army, education), but also information asymmetries in 
markets, e.g., with respect to so-called ‘experience goods’ (Nelson, 1970).  
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4.4.1. Externalities 
 
Negative externalities 
As my illustrations in the following will show, the bulk of the problems arising in a 
globalized economy may be discussed in light of the classical concept ‘internalization of 
negative externalities’. In case of a negative externality in production, the private costs of 
production do not fully reflect the costs imposed on society, so that production levels are too 
high according to the criterion of Pareto-efficiency (Arrow, 1969). In contrast to the classical 
closed textbook economy in which consumers and producers are located in one single 
country, in a globalized, open economy remedying market failures may become more 
complex. For example, a foreign good may be produced with a technology that pollutes the 
environment – be it traditionally through the by-product ‘waste’ or through negative 
externalities of its main active ingredients, such as nano-particles (‘nanotoxicology’, see also 
Jost, 2009; Oberdoerster, 2005)
36
 – , lowering the production costs compared to a (possibly) 
domestic good that satisfies strict national environmental laws. Classical economic theory 
now predicts rational, selfish consumers to buy the cheaper, otherwise homogeneous foreign 
product (this prediction may be different if we assume strong other-regarding preferences, 
e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
37
; consequently, a high domestic demand for the foreign good 
causes a level of pollution that is not Pareto-efficient, while the environmentally-friendly, but 
more expensive domestic good faces a market demand of zero.
38
 Without government 
intervention, the more expensive local producer leaves the market, while the foreign producer 
survives, suboptimally increasing worldwide pollution (Copeland and Taylor, 1994).
39
 
 
Analogous examples of social and environmental externalities generated abroad include any 
other good that is produced with a lower social standard as compared to the country they are 
exported to – be it under a weak employment protection scheme, child labor, under violation 
of human rights, with discriminatory practices, without a minimum wage, under a limited to 
non-existing welfare state, and/or without any type of social or health insurance. All these 
worsenings of working conditions serve to artificially lower the costs of (labor-intensive) 
production (in developing countries) and to, from the viewpoint of the importing (developed) 
countries with higher social standards, to swamp their markets with goods at dumping prices 
(Sinn, 2003) – as illustrative example, Busse and Spielmann (2006) show that child labor does 
lower production costs in developing countries. Overall, without domestic government 
intervention, so the public’s fear, the inflow of such goods into the domestic market will 
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either drive domestic firms into bankruptcy and/or induce a world-wide race to the bottom in 
terms of labor protection and social standards (see, e.g., Fischer and Somogyi, 2012, on 
employment protection; Dreher and Gaston, 2007, on union density; Sinn, 2003, for a more 
general treatment of social dumping).
40
  
 
In order to preserve certain social and environmental standards in the importing society, 
domestic governments may choose to intervene in their national goods markets so that foreign 
produce is sold at a price that internalizes the social and environmental externalities under 
which they had been produced. Means for internalizing such social standard and human rights 
externalities generated abroad may include classical trade policy instruments in the importing 
country applied to specific goods (quotas, tariffs), but also classical externality-correcting 
public choice instruments such as Pigovian taxes (Pigou, 1928) and licenses (as currently 
applied in international Climate-preserving CO2 reduction policies), as well as norm-setting 
(‘rules of the game’) through international treaties on labor standards/human rights in general 
(e.g., ILO convention; see the discussion of multi-level governance in section 4.5.).
41
 In case 
of environmental damage, another, alternative instrument to combat pollution may be the 
government-induced transfer of clean (green) production technologies (Copeland and Taylor, 
1994).  
 
An important, but non-classical example of an externality is that of price spill-overs across 
world markets for staple food and the resulting substitution effects regarding land use, both 
severely impacting food consumption and life expectancies of people in developing countries. 
Specifically, a rise in demand for a certain agricultural good as input factor in production will 
increase the price also for those who demand the same good for simple consumption – 
because arable land worldwide is rather fixed (at least in the short-run), supply is quite price-
inelastic, leading to a large price spill-over from the production factor market to the 
consumption good market (see also Fischer, 2008). Current examples include maize that is an 
input factor in the production of electricity and of meat, but also used as staple food, or soy 
beans that also form the base for biofuel production (FAO, 2008).
42
 In addition, a growing 
world demand for one type of grain impacts the use of (worldwide fixed) plots for its 
(imperfect) substitutes, i.e. there is substitution of land use among different types of grain 
(Villoria and Hertel, 2011). Thus, a rising demand for meat or milk in the world market, for 
example because of taste changes in Asia, increases the price for all types of grain worldwide 
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likewise, thus jeopardizing the well-being of the impoverished who may not be able to afford 
their diaries any more (‘food insecurity’, FAO, 2008; Vadrot and Pohoryles, 2010). 
  
While price externalities across close substitutes (for example, across goods 1 and 2, so that 
∂p1/∂x2 ≠ 0) as such are not regarded as classical externalities, the impact of the consumption 
of one part of world population (A) on the well-being of the other part (B) definitely is 
(∂U(B)/∂x(A) < 0), calling for government intervention. Improvement of worldwide staple 
food allocation would be achieved through policy means that internalize these negative 
externalities from meat/fuel consumption – for example through direct governmental 
regulation of the market (e.g., fixing the quantity of meat production). Alternatively, 
regulations concerning production technologies for meat and milk (‘ethical husbandry’) may 
serve the same purpose of increasing production costs and thereby lowering milk and meat 
consumption - a policy that may also raise the well-being of the animals involved. Finally, in 
analogy to the Pigovian ‘junk food tax’ or ‘fat tax’ proposed to internalize public health costs 
of obesity (e.g. Brownell et al., 2009; Mytton et al., 2007; Vartanian et al., 2007), negative 
spill-overs from meat, milk, and biofuel production to grain markets would be reduced 
through imposing a consumption tax on these commodities. 
 
Briefly turning to the example of the selfish, young, risk-neutral male traders acting in the 
financial markets discussed in section 4.1., a small financial transaction tax on trade with 
financial derivatives such as options and futures, but also on that with stock shares, large 
enough to neutralize arbitrage gains from computer-based high frequency trading and from 
marginal course changes, might suffice to deter from further short-term investment and 
speculation. Such transaction tax has been proposed by, to name a few, economist J. Tobin, 
financier G. Soros, politician A. Merkel, and has now been implemented by the French 
government under the presidency of N. Sarkozy.
43
 The danger of speculation in the essential 
goods markets (water, food, electricity, etc.) for the real economy became just recently 
evident again by an almost-break-down of the electricity distribution system in Germany 
(February 2012) due to an artificially created supply shortage (Spiegel, 2012), similar to the 
electricity crises that occurred in California in 2000 and 2001 (Sweeney, 2002; Weare, 
2003).
44
 In essential goods markets, securing supply at stable, reasonable prices would best be 
achieved by prohibiting short-term trade with assets linked to these essential goods, possibly 
combined with their government provision (see section 4.3.3.). All these proposed market 
regulations would substantially calm down international financial and essential goods 
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markets, reducing price volatility and preventing prices disconnected from the economic 
fundamentals, thereby reducing externalities from price jumps and price insecurity on the real 
economies worldwide. Like for any other Pigovian tax, while a financial transaction tax might 
raise substantial revenue for the government, one should not forget that its main purpose is 
not to generate revenue but to correct an otherwise Pareto-inefficient allocation of goods and 
resources.  
 
Finally, many immigration issues can be discussed and viewed under the heading 
‘externalities’ – either between two countries (the sending and the receiving country) or 
between the two labor markets in these countries. In principle, immigrants respond, like any 
other rational human being, to economic incentives, and weight the costs of emigrating 
(including the opportunity costs of leaving home – the ‘push factors’) against the expected 
gains to be reaped in the host country (the ‘pull factors’) (Borjas, 1989; Massey et al., 1993).45 
Recent examples include the large inflow of young Spanish, Italian, and Greek immigrants 
into Germany in 2011 – an increase up to 80% compared to 2010 -, the Euro crisis has let 
youth unemployment rates in the PIGS-countries skyrocket up to the 50 percent level 
(Sueddeutsche, 2011). This immigration into Germany (from the German point of view) 
creates positive spill-over effects in the PIGS labor markets (by diminishing their over-supply 
of labor), but also positive effects in the German market (as labor shortages, driving up 
employers’ labor costs, are remedied). According to neo-classical trade-theory, migration 
from countries with labor oversupply into countries with labor shortages constitutes a win-
win-situation for both countries, a so-called Pareto-improvement (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2012). Immigration, however, might have negative, welfare–lowering effects on the host 
country: in case of already existing unemployment, or if skills of immigrants did not match 
employers’ needs, labor oversupply would be generated or acerbated, which not only would 
exert (further) wage pressure on the already employed, but also (even when wages were 
flexible) would increase unemployment (see e.g., Borjas, 2003, 2006).
46
 In that case, the 
sending country would exert a welfare-lowering externality on the receiving country.  
 
In either case of positive and negative externalities of immigration, government regulation 
may be useful: in the first case of Pareto-improvement, financial support for immigration 
(emigration) and government programs facilitating migration (e.g., language courses free of 
charge, etc.) may be considered, whereas in the second case of negative externalities skill- and 
demand-specific regulations in the receiving country may be called upon, possibly a national 
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government’s fine-tuning of already existing supranational agreements (see, e.g., Panizzon, 
2011; section 4.3.5.). As alternative to the direct regulation of migration inflows through 
quotas, receiving countries’ governments might reduce externalities by letting immigrants pay 
an ‘entry ticket’ or sell/auction ‘permits’ for immigration (similarly, Becker and Becker, 
1998) – while, in the publicly less often discussed case of a negative externality through 
emigration in the sending country, domestic governments could sell ‘exit’ tickets – possibly to 
be paid by the future employer abroad (an illustrative example for such externality-generating 
emigration is given when publicly-educated physicians and engineers leave Germany with an 
already-existing supply shortage for more attractive positions abroad). Selling exit/entry 
tickets to migrants constitutes a type of a Pigovian tax that internalizes possibly negative 
externalities from migration.
47
  
 
 
The Coase theorem 
According to the Coase theorem externalities emerge as consequence either of missing 
property rights or of their missing enforcement (‘rule of law’) (Coase, 1960)  – a view that 
leads to a set of internalization policies different from the already discussed Pigovian taxes, 
import tariffs, or harmonization of standards at the supranational level. In the Coasian view, 
externalities are simply caused by a deficiency in the legal institutions which establish 
markets, - while the externality-combatting government regulations discussed above 
constitute an intervention in assumedly already existing markets. In application to the 
externality ‘air pollution’ (and analogously for ‘climate change’), the Coase theorem suggests 
that if the people were appropriated the ‘good air’ in their country, they could charge the 
polluting firm for her ‘good air consumption’; however, if, instead, the ‘property of good air’ 
was assigned to the polluting firm, in order to achieve lower pollution levels the people had to 
compensate the firm owner for her profit loss (see Kahn, 2006, for an application to Hong-
Kong). Environmental externalities across countries may also be combatted by allowing 
health-affected consumers in country A (being proprietors of their own bodies) to bargain 
with the polluting firm located in country B (that is to sue the polluting firm for compensation 
of health damages), so that the foreign company would reduce its pollution to the Pareto-
efficient level. Overall, in the Coasian world international environmental externalities would 
be tackled in two ways: either through establishing a new market by assigning property rights, 
here in the first case regarding the ‘good air’, or, as in the second case, through creating cross-
national law enforcement devices that would enable any person to sell the right to damage her 
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‘good health’ in the already-existing domestic ‘good health market’ of another country. Coase 
assumes these market transactions and the resulting Pareto-efficient allocation to be the 
outcome of a bilateral bargaining process. In principle, with no transaction costs, property 
rights assigned to either party (the polluter or the consumers) let market mechanisms bring 
about the Pareto-efficient allocation, but with stark differences in the resulting income 
distribution. In real life, however, this Coase solution fails because of coordination problems 
among the multitude of consumers (’transaction costs’).  
 
Positive externalities 
Positive externalities in production or consumption equally call for government intervention, 
e.g., by means of a negative Pigovian tax (‘subsidy’) – in the case of a positive externality in 
production, the amount produced would be below the Pareto-efficient level as the additional 
benefits for society would not have been internalized by the private agent (Arrow, 1969). It is 
well known that private R&D investment with its positive knowledge-spillover into other 
firms, into other economic sectors (or even into foreign countries) is one area of economic 
activity in which private engagement is below the Pareto-efficient level, constituting a typical 
case for necessary government intervention (Arrow, 1962; for a literature review, see Klette et 
al., 2000). Indeed, government spending on cooperative R&D appears to successfully crowd-
in private engagement (Fölster, 1995), letting such subsidies – contradicting a neo-liberal 
world view – become growth-enhancing and welfare-improving (e.g., Wooden et al., 2012, on 
the cost-effectiveness of government support for green technology). In the case of R&D, such 
negative Pigovian tax targeted in the right way may be recommended for the faster invention 
and adoption of new technologies.  
 
In sum, also in the era of globalization allocation-optimizing national policies are called for 
that intervene in, and regulate, markets when negative or positive externalities occur. 
 
 
4.4.2. Information asymmetries 
The classical task of governments to intervene in, or establish, markets through providing 
institutional frameworks persists in a globalized economy also with respect to information 
asymmetry that creates uncertainty about goods’ characteristics (Akerlof, 1970). In classical 
textbook-models of a closed economy, information asymmetries between buyers and sellers 
lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation and welfare loss, as goods of higher quality are ceased 
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to be produced and sold (Akerlof, 1970).
48
 Particularly in a globalized economy, it may be 
even more difficult for domestic consumers to assess the quality of consumption goods that 
have been produced abroad through complex, thus intransparent and impervious production 
processes, under unknown societal circumstances (see Figure 1). In fact, most of the 
international financial crises described above were also caused by traders’ uncertainty about 
financial products or the agents who sold them (be it national governments, commercial 
banks, financial agencies, fond managers, etc.). In such cases economic theory suggests 
governments to remedy this information asymmetry, for example by introducing warranties 
and labels that signal quality, based on assessments of some independent public agencies 
(Akerlof, 1970; Bond, 1982), either on the national or even on the supranational level (see 
also section 4.5. on multilevel governance).
49
 Indeed, assuming ordinary, downward-sloping 
demand curves in a model of international trade, Levin (2001) predicts for normal 
consumption goods that gains from trade rise when buyer’s information about the goods is 
improved. 
 
 
Figure 1: Complex production of canned Tuna 
Source: FDA (2011), p. 14. 
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For disseminating to the public (as public good) otherwise private information on the quality 
of commodities, in the past, testing agencies have been founded either by concerned 
consumers themselves (originally as club good, e.g., the ‘Technischer Überwachungs-Verein’ 
(TÜV) in Germany) or by national governments concerned about public health (e.g., the ‘US 
National Food and Drug Administration’ (FDA), the NGO but tax revenue-financed ‘Stiftung 
Warentest’, etc.); in principle, also high-quality profit-maximizing firms should be interested 
in establishing an agency that signals the true quality of their products and thus aids to 
generate a consumer demand (alternative instruments include ‘brand names’, government-
accredited in-firm test laboratories, etc., see Bond, 1982). Recently a debate started on the role 
of corporate social responsibility of so-called ‘lead sellers’ in global markets for setting food 
and product safety standards at the global level (Best and Mamic, 2008). In a globalized 
economy, not only international commodity exchange, but also various past crashes in 
financial markets, have revealed the need for such independent agencies that remedy 
information asymmetries in asset and goods markets (e.g., Guiso et al., 2010, on the role of 
trust in the interbank exchange) (including the necessity of bank regulations to avoid further 
outsourcing of business risks to the taxpayer).  
 
Not only national testing agencies may impose a quality check on now-overwhelming masses 
of imports prior to their admission to the domestic market, but also international agreements 
on common technical safety and quality standards (e.g., ‘best practice’) may serve the purpose 
of combating information asymmetries between domestic buyers and foreign sellers (see also, 
FDA, 2011; see also section 4.5.). These quality-assessing agencies should be granted 
financial and administrative independence - on the one hand, from the sellers (who have an 
incentive as rational profit-maximizers to disguise the true (low) quality of their products; 
Akerlof, 1970), but, on the other hand, also from the government itself (which equally may 
acts as seller in goods and assets markets, or may be inclined to instrumentalize the agency for 
other policy purposes) - ensuring that these agencies provide information that is both accurate 
and credible. Acknowledging these new government tasks in a globalized economy, the US 
FDA proclaimed on the 24
th
 February 2012 to make its transformation into “a modern public 
health regulator in a globalized economy”, in order to “build a public health safety net for 
consumers around the world, created, supported, and maintained by global coalitions of 
regulators” (FDA, 2012) – the latter implying the strategic interaction with its counterparts 
abroad (FDA, 2011).  
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Thus, as masses of untested imports flood domestic markets and production processes become 
more complex and globalized, combating information asymmetries between sellers and 
buyers in markets is another classical government task which gains new importance in the era 
of globalization (e.g. FDA, 2011).  
 
 
4.4.3. Public provision of essential goods 
Globalization also underlines the importance of the classical, ‘public goods’-provision-task of 
domestic governments: Often, the process of opening-up domestic markets to the world is 
paralleled by a continuing privatization of formerly public industries – hoping that 
privatization would lower government spending and that competition between now-private 
suppliers would reduce managers’ rent-seeking and ensure production at competitive costs, 
which would also profit the common citizen, so supportive arguments go (Boyken et al., 
1996; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Niskanen, 1971; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Schmidt, 
1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Stiglitz, 2002; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Williamson, 
1964).
50
 However, privatization shifts managers’ goal from pursuing a purely cost-covering, 
but population-wide supply to leading a profit-maximizing enterprise instead – consequently, 
management may lay off excess workers (e.g. Blanchard, 1997; Pint, 1991; Saal and Parker, 
2001), but also actively lower firm’s search costs (e.g. Parker, 1997 for the UK), and simply 
shut down unprofitable branches, leaving some remotely living citizens without supply 
(Caves, 1990, for British railway; Pint, 1991).
51
 Furthermore, newly privatized, domestic 
firms may also use profits generated in their home countries to finance market expansion to 
foreign countries – all these factors triggering rising prices for consumers at home (e.g. 
Parker, 1997; Saal and Parker, 2000, 2001, on water supply privatization in England and 
Wales since 1989; Bel and Fageda, 2010, on airport charges).
52
 In addition, these formerly 
public, now privately-owned monopolies or oligopolies, which often supply in already 
concentrated markets, have a strong incentive to avoid competition by (jointly) exploiting 
their market power – despite potential government regulation (Parker, 1997; Yarrow, 1999). 
Indeed, in most principal agent models with asymmetric information between a monopoly 
firm and the regulating government the first-best (social-planner) allocation cannot be 
reached, leading in some cases to worse allocations compared to government ownership (e.g. 
Baron and Myerson, 1982; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994)
53
. In 
contrast, privatization in ‘markets with perfect competition’ or under ‘competitive pressure’, 
combined with the absence of government corruption, may well have the expected production 
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cost-lowering and efficiency-increasing effects, despite its distributional consequences (e.g. 
Baron and Myerson, 1982; Frydman et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Zhang et al., 
2010). Finally, the products of these newly privatized firms may now, like any other good in 
the world, be subject to the speculation of traders, causing a high volatility in world market 
prices – causing food insecurity, energy insecurity and black-outs, as well as unaffordable 
drinking water prices, etc. (see section 4.1.). 
 
In sum, most privatization policies in Europe and other parts of the world appear to have 
failed as the following evidence would seem to suggest: these newly privatized firms 
generated highly concentrated national or regional markets, with prices for consumers often 
having quadrupled ten years after privatization, and little gains in economic performance, 
measured by amount supplied or growth in productivity (e.g. Stiglitz, 2002; Frydman et al., 
2002, analyzing 500 state and privatized firms in post-communist Poland, Czech Republic 
and Hungary of 1994; Zhang et al., 2002, on privatization of the electricity sector in 51 
developing countries from 1980 on).
54
 Recent examples of rather failed privatizations of 
former state monopolies include electricity supply, train companies, postal systems and 
airports, but similar observations are made for water supply and grain production (e.g., Bel 
and Fageda, 2010; Saal and Parker, 2001; Zhang et al., 2002). While, in general, economic 
globalization, forcing to open up domestic markets (liberalization), creates competitive 
pressures, it does not appear to sufficiently do so in most parts of the concentrated, formerly 
public sector. While, owing to new production technologies, the production of electricity or 
the provision of transport services with trains is accompanied with lower sunk investments 
than decades ago, the grid system through which the service takes place (e.g. the rail tracks or 
the electricity grid) still meets the characteristics of a natural monopoly (‘subadditivity of 
costs’) – in which case having one single supplier is Pareto-efficient. In consequence, 
competition in newly liberalized markets was hampered either by incumbent firms’ ‘natural 
monopoly’ cost structure (e.g., sunk-cost-type distribution system and grids), inducing 
prohibitively high barriers to entry, or by incumbents firms’ collusive behavior against 
potential competitors (e.g., by charging discriminatorily high prices for third-party use of their 
grid system, or their unwillingness to prematurely cease long-term binding contracts with 
their customers, etc.).
55
  
 
 28 
Owing to such failures of privatization, the classical government task to organize and control 
the supply of essential goods (e.g., public utilities) such as water, electricity, infrastructure, 
and basic food remains and grows in importance in a globalized economy. 
 
 
4.5. Multilevel governance  
The classical tasks of domestic governments as described in Musgrave (1959) and as 
discussed in the previous sections 4.1. to 4.3. leave it open on which level of governance 
solutions for market failures are to be sought, and to what extent interplay between 
government tiers should be permitted – so-called ‘multilevel governance’, a term coined by 
Hooghe and Marks (2003). The White Paper on multilevel governance by the EU Committee 
of the Regions (2009) defines multi-level governance within the EU as “coordinated action by 
the European Union, the Member States and local and regional authorities [including cities], 
based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies” (p.6).56 
Possibly, some essential goods may be better publicly provided or regulated at the local level, 
while others better at the state level. Similarly, some externalities may be better targeted at the 
national level, while for others solutions are better sought at the inter-governmental level. It is 
often the nature of the market failure itself that determines which governance level is the 
appropriate one – e.g., for securing a nation’s safety against external intruders the national 
level appears ‘naturally’ as appropriate (‘army’). In many cases, however, responsibility for 
achieving a certain policy goal has to be divided and shared across government tiers (White 
Paper, 2009).  
 
Economic theory suggests that spill-overs across nations can most easily be internalized 
through coordination at the supranational level (international treaties and regulations, 
‘horizontal multi-level governance’), viewing the involved sovereign states as players in 
prisoners’-dilemma/social-dilemma/public-goods-type games (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2012; 
Petersen, 2009). In laboratory experiments, communication among players and joint rule-
setting with sanctions and rewards helps establishing the cooperative equilibrium (Bochet et 
al., 2006; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Noussair and Tan, 2011).
57
 
Consistent with game theory, the White Paper (2009) and its Follow-Up (2012) propose 
“principles and mechanisms of consultation, coordination, cooperation and evaluation” 
(White paper, 1999, p.7) as such coordination and cooperation devices, also emphasizing the 
importance of mutual trust, with the aim to facilitate multilevel governance in general, but 
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particularly for areas where multilateral global governance is needed.
58
 For example, a world-
wide applied Tobin-type financial transaction tax would constitute such a regulatory device 
preventing cross-country externalities (see section 4.4.); another example is the coordination 
of sovereign states on a joint set of values in order to control governments’ economic, 
political, and social activities worldwide, creating legal constrains (‘international law’) in a 
otherwise ‘morality-free intergovernmental space’ (Cottier and Hertig, 2003). Such 
“constitution of mankind” (Kadelbach and Kleinlein, 2007; Petersen, 2009; Tomuschat, 1997) 
may include both norms with a constitutional character that form part of some ‘public 
administrative law’, but also ‘norms of an objective existence’ that are rather grounded in 
fundamental philosophical principles on a meta-level (Kadelbach and Kleinlein, 2008); for 
example, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘Human/Fundamental Rights’ (e.g., Follow-Up, 2012; 
Rittberger and Schimmelpfennig, 2006) belong to the first group of norms, while proposed 
ethical norms with respect to the exploitation of the commons or the creation of supranational 
public goods may belong to the second (e.g., ‘Common Concern’, Cottier, 2012). However, 
supranational coordination devices are missing with respect to most of the other market 
failures identified above in section 4.4., of which many developed or were exacerbated 
through globalization (e.g. Castle, 2000; Baltensperger and Cottier, 2010), often paralleled by 
a shrinking state capacity to sufficiently regulate these failures unilaterally and autonomously 
(‘denationalization’, Cottier and Hertig, 2003; Grimm, 2005).  
 
Unilateral national-level regulations may, to some extent, serve as substitutes for missing 
international coordination devices, economically leading to a second-best allocation (Petersen, 
2009). In a game-theoretical social dilemma context, a unilateral regulation may be exemplary 
and serve as role model, constituting a form of leadership that, in the long-run, equally brings 
about the cooperative equilibrium (Güth et al., 2007; Levati et al., 2007).
59
 Recent examples 
for such behavior may be the unilateral introduction of a Tobin-type tax in France in January 
2012 or, half a year before, the decision by the German government to phase out producing 
nuclear energy. Complementing regulations by local authorities to national rules may be 
useful either for taking account of heterogeneity across jurisdictions that could not be 
addressed at the higher level, or for addressing commitment problems at the national level 
(‘vertical multi-level governance’); a more local and decentralized approach in multi-level 
governance is recommended, e.g., for climate change, energy and ecological issues, by Betsill 
and Bulkeley (2006), Follow-Up (2012), for immigration and integration policies by Panizzon 
(2011), Follow-Up, (2012), for EU bioenergy policies by Söderberg (2008), Vadrot and 
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Pohoryles, (2010), for technical development assistance and political dialogue with 
developing countries (Follow-UP, 2012), and, finally, for EU common agricultural policy, 
maritime policy and implementation of the single market (Follow-Up, 2012).
60
 Some authors 
go so far to conclude that while globalization disempowers the nation state, it “enhances the 
sovereignty of the local” (Ilgen, 2003, p.2). New forms of multi-level governance may also 
include the partnership between companies and local governments (‘cross-sectoral alliance’, 
Follow-Up, 2012). 
 
Taken altogether, while the classical government tasks of providing macro-economic stability, 
remedying market failures, and redistributing income remain and gain new importance in the 
age of globalization, the governance level(s) at which specific policies and regulations are 
finally to be implemented is a question beyond the scope of this very generic analysis.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper uses predictions of theoretical models of trade and empirical evidence thereof to 
build an argument that economic globalization triggers unavoidable economic consequences 
and adjustment processes for the domestic economy. Moreover, I argue that, going beyond a 
purely ‘disciplining effect’ (Cai and Treisman, 2005), globalization constrains governments’ 
policy choice set in general, possibly to an extent that actual policy choices are mainly 
ideology-free, thus rather being driven by the demands and needs of investors and producers 
in the highly-profitable exporting sector. However, I also highlight and provide examples for 
(domestic) policy challenges that persist in a globalized economy - mainly the classical 
government tasks (Musgrave, 1959) of regulating the domestic economy in the presence of 
market failures (externalities, information asymmetries, public goods), in addition to 
stabilizing the national economy and smoothing transformation processes therein through 
redistributing income between winners and losers, - arguing that these classical government 
tasks become even more imperative as a country starts globalizing.  
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1
 Parts of this article are based on the working paper “Globalization and Political Trust”, NCCR Trade 
Regulation Working Paper No. 2012/05.   
2
 In classical theories of trade, the production factor labor is assumed to be immobile, while capital is assumed to 
move easily across countries (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2012).  
3
 In general, the literature has not reached consensus on how globalization affects government spending. It may 
well be argued, and some empirical evidence points in that direction, that governments redistribute more to 
certain groups or protect some groups stronger than others as its economies globalize, possibly to appease the 
losers from this development or simply because of their lobbying power (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Fischer 
and Somogyi, 2012; Garrett 1995, 1998; Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). In 
contrast, Dreher, Sturm, and Ursprung (2008) and Dreher (2006) do not find globalization to affect government 
or social spending.  
4
 See Schulze and Ursprung (1999) for a review of the early literature on the effects of globalization on social 
and welfare spending. 
5
 In principle, technological spill-overs across countries could cause a reversal of the current pattern of 
specialization, in case these more-than-neutralize the sector-size dependent learning effect.  
6 Felbermayer, Prat, and Schmerer (2011) show empirically that, at least in OECD countries, in the long-run 
increased openness reduces unemployment. This finding contradicts textbook predictions that trade openness had 
no long-run effect on unemployment; Krugman (1993, p.25) states: “Trade policy should be debated in terms of 
its impact on efficiency, not in terms of phony numbers about jobs created or lost.” However, some modern trade 
theories predict an increase in long-run unemployment, possibly through frictional unemployment, minimum 
wage, or segmented labor markets (as in developing countries) (e.g. Baghwati and Srinivasan, 2002; Brecher, 
1974; Davis, 1998; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010).   
7
 See Burtless (1995) for an in-depth discussion of labor market models with free trade to explain increasing 
wage inequality.  
8
 Implicit evidence for growing wage inequality can be drawn from Blanchflower et al. (1996) who show that 
wages grow overportionally as profitability of firms rise. The empirical evidence on income disparities in place 
of wage disparities is more ambiguous (e.g., Dollar, 2002; Dreher and Gaston, 2006).  
9
 The literature employs the revealed comparative advantage index which is based on sector-specific export 
shares. For a description, see Balassa (1965) and Vollrath (1991). 
10
 Source: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/11/articles/lv0911029i.htm (download: 28th December 
2011) 
11
 This may exclude very specialized industries producing high quality products, possibly luxury goods, e.g. high 
quality clothing and textiles, or high quality processed farm products, such as premium olive oil (see, e.g. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/economic-sectors/industrial-goods/textiles-and-footwear/, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/economic-sectors/agriculture/, downloaded 26
th
 December 2011).  
12
 Notably, this is the view of developed Europe, Japan, and the US. ILO (1996) also states that shifting the 
production to developing countries created jobs in these economies. For example, during the same period, 
sectoral employment rose by 33% in Turkey and by 85% in China.  
13
 Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,463172,00.html (downloaded 26
th
 December 2011). 
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14
 In 2007, the German subsidies for mining amounted to 2.7 billion Euros. Source: see preceding footnote. 
15
 “The domino pattern indicates that global crashes, which can hardly be diversified, do not occur abruptly but 
rather evolve out of prior local or regional crashes” (Markwat et al., 2009, p.1997). 
16
 Forbes (2004) proves the existence of the trade channel by showing that exporting firms are hit stronger by 
international financial crises than firms producing for the domestic market only. Focusing exclusively on the 
occurrence of currency crises, Haile and Pozo (2008) find a dominance of international trade linkages over 
having common lenders. 
17
 Lazear (2011) views the 2008/09 and the 2011 crises as ‘popcorn effects’ rather than ‘domino effects’. Edison 
et al. (1998) present a theoretical model explaining the domino effect in the 1998 Asian financial market crisis. 
See Kahn and Park (2009) for more empirical literature on contagion effects between 1987 and 2009. The 
Mexican crisis spilled over so far that the IMF provided financial assistance also to neighboring Latin American 
countries (Ito, 2007).  
18
 For a comprehensive summary, see, e.g., http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ 
(28
th
 December 2011). Spill-overs to European banks occurred because they had bought large bulks of those 
mortgage backed securities, often after decennials of fighting against national bank regulation laws that restricted 
investment in risky (but potentially more profitable) business. 
19
 The Maastricht criteria allow a maximum of 60% of GDP only. 
20
 A ‘wake-up-effect’ lets investors check the creditworthiness of countries with characteristics similar to the 
country first in financial difficulties, in this case Greece (see Forbes, 2004). 
21
 The lowering of the PIGS-countries’ ratings of creditworthiness is a rational consequence of their 
governments’ present-time imprudent economic policy making, on the one hand, but also partly because of the 
many ‚old’ government debts originating from the US mortgage market crises back in 2008-09. 
22
 Greece received a $163 billion loan in May 2011 (Alessi, 2011). A second loan of 130 billion Euro (that 
included a substantial haircut) was approved by the Euro countries on the 14
th
 March 2012 (followed by a 28 
million Euro credit of the IMF on the 15
th
 March). A third bailout package is already in preparation. 
23
 Davis and Stone (2004) provide an enumeration of banking and currency crisis episodes in developing and 
developed countries between the 1970ies and 2000.  
24
 Higher inflation as predictor of exchange rate change particularly occurs in emerging economies (Ito, 2007). 
25
 As reported by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE), press 
release of 8
th
 December 2011. 
26
 Unemployment rates have been obtained from Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home) (29
th
 December 2011). 
27
 Under strict model assumptions, predicted positive effects of economic globalization include higher overall 
welfare, optimized consumption patterns, higher rents for production factors in the exporting sector (e.g. higher 
wages for low-skilled in developing countries), higher levels of general employment, and higher overall growth 
(predicted by, e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002; Davidson et al., 1988, 1999; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; 
Felbermayer et al., 2011; Mehlum et al., 1996; Krueger, 1983; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2012; Srinivasan and 
Bhagwati, 2001; for supporting empirical evidence, see, e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan 2002; Dollar, 2001; 
Dollar and Kraay 2004; Felbermayer et al., 2011; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Krueger, 1983). However, many 
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empirical studies also reveal strong distributional conflicts and biased within-sector technological progress 
(Deaton and Dreze, 2002; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2002). 
28
 See, e.g., Fan et al. (2008) on optimal allocation of subsidies in the agricultural sector in India; e.g., Barro and 
Lee (1994) on growth-lowering effect of government – created market distortions and a large government size, 
and a an enhancing of  effect on government investment spending. 
29
 In explanation these effects, Coates and Herbert (2008) argue that “testosterone […] have receptors throughout 
the brain region identified in neuroeconomic research as contributing to irrational financial decisions” (p.6170); 
high levels of testosterone were also found to lead to impulsivity and sensation seeking (Daitzman and 
Zuckerman, 1980). Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) show experimentally that, in addition, testosterone 
levels also positively correlate with abstract reasoning ability.  
30
 The fact that traders and investment bankers also compete on a personal level with each other may cause an 
additional rise in testosterone level, in analogy to what has been widely observed for sports competition among 
young adult men (for a review, see Booth et al., 2011). 
31
 Barro (1990) suggests that the government size-growth-relation is not monotonic; Afonso et al. (2005) suggest 
that the effect of government activities depend on government efficiency (similarly, Angelopulos and 
Philoppopoulos, 2007).  
32
  On the importance of a credible communication for establishing political trust see Fischer (2012). 
33
 Contrasting empirical evidence is presented in Dollar (2001). 
34
 The empirical literature on the effects of government grants on the performance of small enterprises and start-
ups is inconclusive: e.g., no significant impact is found for businesses in the U.K. or Italy, while studies for East 
Germany and New Zealand reveal beneficial employment effects (Caliendo, 2008; Dubini, 1989; Perry 2006; 
Reid and Smith, 2000). For a literature review, see Witt and Hack (2008) (in German). 
35
 Regulation as form of government intervention in markets is to be distinguished from general rule-setting task 
that provides the legal framework for exchange in markets (e.g. rule of law, property rights protection, etc.). Put 
more simply, regulations refer to existing markets which are established through legal frameworks. 
36
 For example, Cedervall (2011) demonstrates that the ingestion of nano-plastic particles-(Polystyrene) 
contaminated algae changes the fat metabolism in fishes.  
37
 Other-regarding preferences include forms of altruism and inequality aversion – which may be summarized as 
‘moral or cooperative behavior’ in non-economic social sciences. Economists, in general, expect the weight on 
the self-regarding utility component to be larger than that on the other-regarding component.  
38
 This is the theoretical prediction and the public fear. The empirical analysis by Antweiler et al. (2001) suggests 
that international trade has no effect on the level of pollution worldwide.  
39
 The concept of Pareto-efficiency does not imply that optimal levels of world-wide pollution are zero.  
40
 In contrast, Dreher et al (2012) find that economic globalization fosters human rights – probably with 
economic growth and national wealth as its transmission channels.  
41
 For a discussion on international treaties as means to protect such standards in a trade context, see Bürgi-
Bonamoni (2012).  
42
 Besides the negative externality on food security in developing countries, through land-use change the 
production of biofuel, meat, and milk appears to contribute positively to greenhouse gas emissions, as former 
grassland and forest are converted into new arable plots (Searchinger et al., 2008; Hertel et al., 2010, Weiss et 
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al., 2012). In addition, the introduction of bioenergy politics became associated with problems of property rights 
protection and land grabbing in developing countries (Vadrot and Pohoryles, 2010). 
43
  See “Jobs with Justice: Financial Speculation Tax” http://www.jwj.org/jobs/speculationtax/index.html 
(retrieved 23 February 2012), which also provides historical examples of financial speculation taxes.  
44
 An account of the Californian electricity crisis can be found in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_electricity_crisis (retrieved 24th February 2012).  
45
 See Castles (2000) for a critical assessment of this neo-classical economics explanation of migration 
46
 Notably, producers profit from such development as their labor costs decline.  
47
 For a general discussion of the auction model to channel immigration, see, e.g., Bauer and Zimmermann, 
2000; Ochel, 2001. 
48
 Akerlof (1970) assumes that consumer’s willingness to pay depends on the average quality of the goods (here: 
used cars) in the market; in consequence, suppliers of an above-average quality receive a payment too low and 
have to leave the market, reducing the mean quality in the market and letting market size shrink. 
49
 Information asymmetries can be partly (but not fully) remedied by building-up of reputation by private agents 
(Bond, 1982).   
50
 See Yarrow (1999) for the role of fiscal pressure to trigger privatization and an account of potential pitfalls in 
the process.  
51
 Pint (1991) compares the production decision of a government-owned monopoly with that of a government-
regulated private monopoly firm and private information on its cost structure, assuming that both types are led 
by rent-seeking managers. She finds that the government-owned firm produces more labor-intensively and offers 
larger supply at a lower unit-price, compared to the government-regulated private firm, providing larger benefits 
to the consumer but generating only zero profits.  
52
 Parker (1997, 2001) provides examples that, initially after privatization, extraordinarily high profits have been 
achieved despite regulation and price-capping through the government.  
53
 Notably, a government-owned company equally leads to an allocation deviating from the first-best. The 
theoretical question is which one of the two second-best allocations is to be preferred from a welfare-maximizing 
perspective.  
54
 Frydman et al. (2002) show that privatization effects depend on who is given the control during the 
transformation process, to insiders (managers, employees) or to outsiders (foreigners or domestic financial 
firms). In either case, compared to state companies, no cost-reducing (employment-lowering) effects of 
privatization are found, contradicting Blanchard (1997). Only in case control is given to outsiders, revenue and 
productivity are observed to increase, but not so otherwise. The role of control during privatization processes 
was already raised in Kay and Thompson (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994).  
55
 On the liberalization policy of the EU in the European electricity market see de Sépibus (2008).  
56
 The EU documents (White Paper, 2009; Follow-Up, 2012) also emphasize the importance of subsidiarity, 
regionalisation and decentralization when implementing multi-level governance structures. 
57
 Alternative measures include leadership, or priming players (see, e.g. Drouvelis et al., 2010; Güth et al., 2007).    
58
 From a legal viewpoint, coordination and cooperation of sovereign states at the supranational level constitutes 
a form of ‘outsourcing’ of regulations and functions in the ante-globalization era stipulated at the constitutional 
level (Biaggini, 2000; Cottier and Hertig, 2003)  
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59
 This includes also the unilateral introduction of EU-regulations by non-members, see, e.g., Maini (2008), 
Oesch (2009, 2011), Petrov and Kalinichenko (2011). 
60
 With respect to climate change, multi-level governance may be needed as cities are responsible for 75% of 
carbon emissions (Follow-Up, 2012).  
